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Abstract
The disclosure of related party transactions was required in the financial statements
because it is potentially misused by controlling shareholders. This study aims to examine
controlling shareholders, audit committee characteristics, and related party transaction
disclosure. The controlling shareholders are proxied by the family share ownership and
the proportion of the controlling shareholder family members on the board of direc-
tors. The samples used in this study are family companies listed on the Indonesia Stock
Exchange (IDX) in the year 2017. In this study, the multiple regressions were used to test
the hypothesis. We found that controlling shareholders have a negative influence on
related party transaction disclosure. Meanwhile, accounting expertise of the audit com-
mittee has a positive influence on related party transaction disclosure. Our result show
companies that controlled by the family have low motivation to disclose related party
transaction disclosure. However, accounting expertise audit committee may encourage
companies to disclose related party transactions.
Keywords: Audit Committee; Controlling Shareholders; Family Control; Related Party
Transaction Disclosure
JEL Classifications: G32, G34
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Abstrak
Pengungkapan transaksi pihak berelasi diwajibkan dalam laporan keuangan, karena berpotensi
disalahgunakan oleh pemegang saham pengendali. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji
pengaruh pemegang saham pengendali, karakteristik komite audit, dan pengungkapan
transaksi pihak berelasi. Pemegang saham pengendali diproksikan dengan kepemilikan saham
keluarga dan proporsi anggota keluarga pemegang saham pengendali pada jajaran direksi.
Sampel yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah perusahaan keluarga yang listing di
Bursa Efek Indonesia tahun 2017. Penelitian ini menggunakan analisis regresi berganda
untuk menguji hipotesis yang diajukan. Temuan kami menunjukkan pemegang saham
pengendali berepengaruh negatif terhadap pengungkapan transaksi pihak berelasi. Sedangkan,
keahlian akuntansi komite audit berpengaruh positif terhadap pengungkapan transaksi pihak
berelasi. Temuan kami menunjukkan perusahaan yang dikendalikan oleh keluarga cenderung
menyembunyikan transaksi pihak berelasi. Sedangkan, keahlian akuntansi yang dimiliki
komite audit dapat mendorong perusahaan untuk mengungkapkan transaksi pihak berelasi.
Kata Kunci:Komite Audit; Pemegang Saham Pengendali; Kontrol Keluarga; Pengungkapan
Transaksi Pihak Berelasi
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1. Introduction
This study aims to empirically examine the in-
fluence of controlling shareholders, audit committees,
and compliance of related party transaction disclo-
sure. This research is significant because related party
transaction disclosure have a value relevance for share-
holders (Ge et al., 2010). Furthermore, Maigoshi, Latif,
& Kamardin (2018) also found that related party
transaction disclosure have a significant positive ef-
fect on stock market value.
Related party transactions (RPT) has been a
concern since the emergence of corporate financial
scandals in United States, United Kingdom, and sev-
eral other countries; such as the cases of Enron,
Adelphia, and Tyco (Gordon, Henry, & Palia, 2004).
Academic literature suggests that there are two points
of view to interpret related parties’ transaction; effi-
cient transaction and conflict of interest (Gordon,
Henry, & Palia, 2004). Related party transactions are
considered as efficient transactions which are able to
increase the value of the company (Kohlbeck &
Mayhew, 2010) due to its ability to optimize the uti-
lization of resources. Thus, it can reduce transaction
costs (Ge et al., 2010). On the other hand, related
parties transactions may be considered as manage-
ment‘s and controlling shareholders’ opportunistic
behavior (Ge et al., 2010). The controlling shareholder
conducts transactions to related parties or invested in
affiliated companies to maintain their wealth (Setiawan
et al., 2016)
Previous studies found that transaction with
related parties often inflicts a financial loss to minor-
ity shareholders wealth (Jian & Wong, 2010; Nekhili
& Cherif, 2011; El-helaly & Lowe, 2018). The re-
sults of this study suggest that related party transac-
tions tend to create a conflict of interest. Regulators
and standard setters have supervised related party trans-
actions by requiring disclosure of related party trans-
actions (Gordon, Henry, & Palia, 2004). Related party
transactions disclosure that regulated in IAS 24 is a
solution to reduce abuse of related party transactions.
Transparency can be improved through the presenta-
tion and reporting of related party transactions in fi-
nancial statements so that it will reduce information
asymmetry (Utama & Utama, 2014).
The study of related party transactions disclo-
sure had been carried out previously, but it showed
inconsistently. The level of related party transactions
disclosure in Indonesia is 74.20 percent (Utama &
Utama, 2014). Meanwhile, the related party transac-
tions disclosure level in South Africa is 77 percent
(Sellami & Fendri, 2017). While Elkelish (2017) finds
that the level of related party transactions disclosure
in the United Arab Emirates is 12 percent, based on
the evidence above, it can be concluded that there are
no studies that uncover the level of related party trans-
actions disclosure reaching the percentage of 100 per-
cent; whereas the disclosure of related party, the trans-
action is a mandatory process in which the level of
disclosure must be 100 percent. Thus, there are still
problems in related party transactions disclosure.
Corporate governance is a solution to resolve
agency problems between shareholders and manage-
ment or between controlling shareholders and minor-
ity shareholders (Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012;
Wardhani, 2015). The audit committee as part of the
corporate governance mechanism has a responsibility
to improve supervision. Consequently, information
asymmetry can be reduced. Effective audit commit-
tees are expected to improve the quality of financial
statement disclosure including related party transac-
tion disclosure (Haldar & Raithatha, 2017; Sellami
& Fendri, 2017). The formation of the audit commit-
tees in Indonesian public companies has been obligated
since 2004, which was regulated in Decision of the
Chairperson of Bapepam Number: KEP-29/PM/2004.
Researches about audit committee toward dis-
closure had been done previously. Research audit com-
mittee and disclosure in international context i.e. au-
dit committee on intellectual capital disclosure (Li,
Mangena, & Pike, 2012; Haji, 2015), ethical disclo-
sure (Othman et al., 2014), voluntary disclosure
(Mensah, 2018), and related party transaction disclo-
sure (Sellami & Fendri, 2017). Furthermore, research
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on audit committees and disclosures in Indonesia i.e.
audit committees and intellectual capital disclosures
(Arifah, 2012; Zulkarnaen & Mahmud, 2013), dis-
closure of corporate social responsibility (Nussy, 2013;
Krisna & Suhardianto, 2016), mandatory disclosures
(Kharis & Suhardjanto, 2012), voluntary disclosure
(Wijaya, 2009). However, those studies have shown
very few empirical evidence of the influence of audit
committees and mandatory disclosures in International
and Indonesian context (Kharis & Suhardjanto, 2012;
Sellami & Fendri, 2017). Therefore, the research re-
garding the influence of audit committees on manda-
tory disclosure, such as disclosure of related party trans-
actions, is necessary to be conducted.
This research is different from Sellami & Fendri
(2017), i.e., by adding the variable of controlling share-
holder. This variable is quite important to examine
because more related party transactions are carried out
by controlling shareholders (Kang et al., 2014; Utama
& Utama, 2014). Dyanty et al. (2012) state that com-
panies controlled by families have a higher motiva-
tion to conduct related party transactions. This is be-
cause a family may control several companies (groups).
Hence they choose to make transactions with groups
to maintain their wealth. Thus, the family controlling
shareholder is the focus of this study.
Considering several essential considerations, In-
donesia is selected as the research setting of this re-
search. First, most public companies in Indonesia are
controlled by family (Carney & Hamilton-hart, 2015).
Second, Indonesia is a country with weak legal en-
forcement and investor protection (Dyanty et al., 2012;
Darmadi & Sodikin, 2013). Third, Indonesia has low
corporate governance (Utama, Utama, & Amarullah,
2017). Laporta et al. (2000) argue that law enforce-
ment and corporate governance are important mecha-
nisms to protect the rights of minority shareholders.
The low protection on minority shareholders increases
the chance of controlling shareholders to take actions
that can harm minority shareholders; one of them is
related party transactions (Dyanty et al., 2012).
This study is expected to contribute for the de-
velopment of accounting research in terms of manda-
tory disclosure in financial statements, particularly the
influence of the family controlling shareholders, the
characteristics of the audit committee and compliance
with disclosure of related party transactions. Inves-
tors can use the results of this study as a consideration
in making business decisions in Indonesia since most
public companies in Indonesia are controlled by fami-
lies and based on our analysis on our data almost ev-
ery company has related party transactions. In addi-
tion, this finding can also be an input for regulators
to evaluate regularization to be more effective.
This paper is organized as follows: (1) section 2
is literature review and hypotheses development; (2)
section 3 is research methodology; (3) section 4 con-
tains results of the study; (4) section 5 is discussion;
and (5) section 6 contains conclusions, research im-
plications, limitations of research, and suggestions for
future research.
2. Hypotheses Development
Companies controlled by families are more sus-
ceptible to the conflict between majority shareholders
and minority shareholders or called the agency prob-
lem type 2 (Dyanty et al., 2012). This agency problem
is caused families as controller shareholder have more
opportunity to take over the minority shareholder re-
sources (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In addition, a high
level of ownership reduces the interest of controlling
shareholders to ask managers to disclose widely regard-
ing company information, because the controlling
shareholders have access to company information
(Jankensgård, 2018). This situation is getting worse if
a country has weak investor protection (Dyanty et al.,
2012).
Companies that owned by families usually also
place family members on the board of directors
(Abdullah et al., 2015). Directors who come from con-
trolling shareholders are not easily disciplined. This
condition can trigger expropriation the minority share-
holders (Dyanty et al., 2012). Related party transac-
Controlling Shareholders, Audit Committee Characteristics, and Related Party Transaction Disclosure...
Dwi Ernawati & Y. Anni Aryani
| 17 |
tions are one of the ways of controlling shareholders
to expropriate minority shareholders (Ali, Chen, &
Radhakrishnan, 2007; Setiawan et al., 2016).
Some previous studies suggest that companies
that disclose related party transactions have lower stock
prices (Ge et al., 2010; Kohlbeck & Mayhew, 2010;
Elkelish, 2017). This is because investors tend to be
skeptical of related party transactions (Carlo, 2014).
Thus, the company chooses to hide related party trans-
actions so that they can still take advantage of related
party transactions and also the company’s stock price
is maintained.
The study on the effect of family control on
mandatory and voluntary disclosure has been done
before. Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan (2007) found that
family companies had better earnings quality, but fam-
ily companies had a lower level of disclosure of cor-
porate governance. Darmadi & Sodikin (2013) found
that family control had a negative effect on the extent
of voluntary disclosure. This finding indicates that
family companies have lower motivated to express
voluntary disclosure that may contain information
that exposes the company resources used to the per-
sonal interests of controlling shareholders. Employ-
ing the percentage of families in the board of directors
as a proxy for family control, Abdullah et al. (2015)
had documented that companies with large family
controls had a lower mandatory International Finan-
cial Reporting Standard (IFRS) disclosure. Based on
the theory and the results of previous studies, the hy-
pothesis can be stated as follows:
H
1
: share ownership by controlling family has a nega-
tive influence on the related party transaction dis-
closure.
H2: the board of directors from the controlling fam-
ily has a negative influence on the related party
transaction disclosure.
As part of the corporate governance mechanism,
the audit committee has a very important role in in-
vestor protection (Lin, 2018). The audit committee
aims to reduce management’s opportunistic behavior
through oversight mechanisms in the financial report-
ing process (Beasley et al., 2009; Sellami & Fendri,
2017). Thus, the audit committee can reduce infor-
mation asymmetry (Aldamen et al., 2011).
The regulations require that audit committee
members consist of at least three people (OJK, 2015).
The previous study of the number of audit commit-
tees on disclosure showed mixed results. Fatmawati,
Astuti, & Suhardjanto (2018) find the positive affected
between sizes of the audit committees on the volun-
tary disclosure in Indonesia. Salehi & Shirazi (2016)
showed significant positive effect between the size of
the audit committee and the quality of financial dis-
closure. However, Abdullah et al. (2015) conduct study
in Malaysia and Kent & Stewart (2008) in Australia
found the size of the audit committee had a signifi-
cant negative effect on disclosure level. Different from
Kent & Stewart (2008), Abdullah et al., (2015), Salehi
& Shirazi (2016), Sellami & Fendri (2017), and
Fatmawati, Astuti, & Suhardjanto (2018), they do not
find the effect of the size of the audit committee on
related party transactions disclosure.
Based on the analysis of the applicable rules and
the results of previous studies we argued for family
companies, the number of audit committees does not
reflect the diversity of audit committee expertise, so
the hypothesis is formulated as:
H3: the size of the audit committee has a negative ef-
fect on related party transaction disclosure.
Prior studies show the number of audit com-
mittee meetings could reduce earnings management
(Inaam & Khamoussi, 2016). In the disclosure con-
texts, Li et al. (2012) show the number of audit com-
mittee meetings has a significant positive effect on in-
tellectual capital disclosure. Othman et al. (2014) also
find a positive effect between the number of audit com-
mittee meetings and ethical disclosure. Li et al. (2012)
and Othman et al. (2014) present that the audit com-
mittee meeting is a form of management supervision.
This is in accordance with the opinion Menon & Wil-
liams (1994) which states audit committees that only
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hold one meeting cannot be effectively monitored.
Salehi & Shirazi (2016) finds the number of audit
committee meetings has a negative effect on financial
statement disclosure. However, Abdullah et al. (2015)
and Sellami & Fendri (2017) do not find the effect of
the number of audit committee meetings toward the
mandatory disclosure of IFRS. Based on the results
above of previous studies (Li et al., 2012; Othman et
al., 2014), the hypothesis can be stated as, follow:
H
4
: the number of audit committee meetings has a
positive effect on related party transaction dis-
closure.
Some prior studies have examined the effect of
audit committee accounting expertise on disclosure,
i.e., financial statement disclosure and related party
transactions disclosure. Audit committee accounting
expertise has a positive effect on the quality of finan-
cial statements in Singapore (Kusnadi et al., 2015),
quality of financial statements disclosure in Iran (Salehi
& Shirazi, 2016) and related party transactions dis-
closure in South Africa (Sellami & Fendri, 2017).
The previous empirical studies show that ac-
counting expertise can improve the quality of financial
reporting and disclosure in various countries. This is
because knowledge about accounting and auditing held
by audit committees can be useful in dealing with con-
flicts between auditors and management (Salehi &
Shirazi, 2016). Based on the discussion of the results of
previous studies, the hypothesis formulation is:
H5: accounting expertise of the audit committee has
a positive effect on related party transaction dis-
closure.
An independent audit committee can reduce
earnings management (Inaam & Khamoussi, 2016)
and increase of information financial statements dis-
closure (Abdullah et al., 2015; Sellami & Fendri,
2017). Thus, companies with independent audit com-
mittees should have better financial reporting and dis-
closure quality for their independent audit commit-
tees are more objective in making decisions (Salehi &
Shirazi, 2016). However, Kent & Stewart (2008) do
not find the influence of an independent audit com-
mittee on disclosure level in Australia. Based on the
analysis above our hypothesis is:
H6: the independence of the audit committee has a
positive effect on related party transaction dis-
closure.
3. Method, Data, and Analysis
The samples used in this study are companies
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2017.
The sampling technique is purposive sampling with
the criteria as follows: (1) the companies are not the
financial industries as financial companies own par-
ticular regulations; (2) the companies are family com-
panies with the controlling family ownership of more
than 20 percent; (3) the companies disclose the re-
lated party transactions; and (4) the companies present
the information needed in this study. The research data
was obtained from three sources, Indonesia Stock Ex-
change website, company websites, and online news-
papers. The detail samples in this study are explained
in Table 1.
Sample The Number of Firms 
The firm listed on the Indonesian stock exchange in 2017 564 
Deducted  
Firms in the financial industry 89 
Non-family firms 122 
Family share less than 20% 17 
Incomplete data firms 92 
Total Sample 244 
 
Table 1. Sample Data
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In order to examine the controlling sharehold-
ers, audit committee characteristics and related party
transaction disclosure, the dependent variable is the
related party transaction disclosure. The related party
transaction disclosure assessment was arranged based
on related party transaction disclosure checklist (part
of IFRS disclosure checklist) published by Ernst &
Young revised on August 2014. As the research setting
of this study is in Indonesia, the checklists of related
party transaction disclosure were adjusted with the
PSAK (the Financial Accounting Standard) no. 07 re-
vised 2015 and Decision of Chairman of Bapepam-
LK No. KEP-347/BL/ 2012, on June 25, 2012, con-
cerning Presentation and Disclosure of Financial State-
ments of Issuers or Public Companies, concerning Pre-
sentation and Disclosure of Financial Statements for
Public Companies. Based on the results of these ad-
justments, 17 items of assessment were compiled.
Following House & Cooke (1992), Glaum,
Schmidt, & Street (2013), Tsalavoutas & Dionysiou
(2014), Abdullah et al. (2015), and Sellami & Fendri
(2017), a modified dichotomous assessment method
was used to calculate the value of related party trans-
actions disclosure compliance. The companies got “1”
for the required disclosed-item and “0” for required
undisclosed-item. Some disclosure items may not be
applied to every company. Therefore, for disclosure
items that are not relevant in particular companies are
classified as “not applicable,” i.e., the score is not given,
and the number of items that should be disclosed is
one point reduced for each item that is not applied.
This assessment is considered more suitable for assess-
ing disclosure than the unmodified dichotomy method.
In addition, companies that do not disclose the irrel-
evance item of the disclosure are also not aggrieved in
this valuation method (House & Cooke, 1992). Thus,
we calculate the compliance score of related party
transaction disclosure with the following formula:
Where:
Cj = related party transaction disclosure for firm j
T = the number of items disclosed by the company
j
M = the amount of disclosure relevant to the com-
pany j, M < 17
The independent variables in this study are con-
trolling shareholders and audit committee character-
istics. Legal entities or individuals become controlling
shareholders in public companies if they own more
than 50 percent of the paid-up shares or those who
have the ability to regulate and determine company
policies both directly and indirectly (BAPEPAM, 2011)
while Faccio & Lang (2002), Setiaatmaja, Tanewski,
& Skully (2009), and Darmadi & Sodikin (2013) de-
fine controlling shareholders as shareholders with
ownership of 20 percent or more.
In the context of the family firm, Villalonga &
Amit (2006) defines a family as a controlling share-
holder if the family members or the company founders
are on a corporate board or the family has 5 percent
of share or more. Meanwhile, Yeh, Lee, & Woidtke
(2001) use the percentage of family share ownership
and the percentage of controlling shareholders family’s
on company board as proxies. In this study, two proxies
of controlling shareholders are applied. First, family
share ownership is at least 20 percent (Setiaatmaja,
Tanewski, & Skully, 2009; Darmadi & Sodikin, 2013)
and second, the proportion of controlling sharehold-
ers family’s on board of directors (Yeh, Lee, & Woidtke,
2001).
Following the previous research of Salehi &
Shirazi (2016) and Sellami & Fendri (2017), four
measures of audit committee characteristics were used;
the size of the audit committee, the number of audit
committee meetings in one year, the accounting ex-
pertise of audit committee members, and the indepen-
dence of audit committees. The data of audit com-ܥ݆ =  ܶ= Ʃ݅݊  ܯ= Ʃ݅݉   (1) 
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mittee characteristics were obtained from the
company’s annual report in 2017. In order to obtain
the data of audit committee independence, the re-
searcher refers to OJK Regulation No.55/POJK.04/
2015 concerning the establishment and guidelines for
the implementation of the audit committee’s work.
Meanwhile, the data of the accounting expertise au-
dit committee were analyzed from the profile of the
audit committee. Furthermore, accounting expertise
is proxied by the number of the audit committee with
accounting expertise divided by the number of the audit
committee. The proxy also applies to an independent
audit committee.
The control variables in this study are the com-
pany size, leverage, external auditor, and industry type.
Firm size was chosen as a control variable because some
previous studies find that firm size influences the level
of compliance disclosure (Bepari, Rahman, & Mollik,
2014; Sellami & Fendri, 2017; Fatmawati, Astuti, &
Suhardjanto, 2018). Following Bepari, Rahman, &
Mollik (2014) and Sellami & Fendri (2017), firm size
is proxied by the natural logarithm of the total assets.
Furthermore, leverage was also used as the control
variable in this study. High levels of leverage can re-
duce a manager’s opportunistic actions because com-
panies that have high leverage would provide more
comprehensive disclosure to reduce the cost of debt
(Utama & Utama, 2014). Thus, companies with high
leverage would have a better level of information dis-
closure (Sellami & Fendri, 2017). Following Bepari,
Rahman, & Mollik (2014), leverage is proxied with
total debt divided by total assets.
The auditor quality was also used as the con-
trol variable. Hodgdon & Hughes (2016) states the
auditor choice may effect on voluntary disclosure. The
audit quality was measured with dummy variables,
‘1’ for big 4 and ‘0’ for otherwise (Darmadi & Sodikin,
2013; Utama & Utama, 2014). Finally, the type of
industry was controlled as done by Salehi & Shirazi
(2016). The industry controls were measured with a
nominal scale. The type of industry was divided into
eight groups; (1) agriculture, (2) basic and chemical
industry; (3) customer goods industry; (4) miscella-
neous industry; (5) property, real estate, and building
construction; (6) infrastructure, utilities, and trans-
portation; (7) mining; and (8) trade, service, invest-
ment.
The multiple regression models used to test hy-
potheses are as follows:
RPTD =  α + β1 FS+ β2 FD + β3 SKA+ β4 MKA + β5 ACAK 
+ Β6 INKA + β7 SIZE + β8 LEV + β9 AUD + 
β10INDST + ɛ    (2) 
Where:
RPTD : the level of related party transaction dis-
closure
FS : the controlling family share ownership
FD : the proportion of directors affiliated with
the controlling family
SKA : the size of the audit committee
MKA : the number of audit committee meetings
held within a year
ACKA : the proportion of audit committees which
has accounting expertise
INKA : the proportion of independent audit com-
mittee
SIZE : the firm size
LEV : leverage
AUD : the auditor
INDST : the industry type
[ : an error
4. Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 describes the descriptive statistics or sta-
tistical descriptions which include the amount of data,
minimum values, maximum values, mean and stan-
dard deviation on all variables used. The highest value
of disclosure of related party transactions of 0.93 is
owned by PP London Sumatra Indonesia Tbk and Salim
Ivomas Pratama Tbk. Meanwhile, the company with
the lowest related party transactions disclosure value
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is Anugerah Kagum Karya Utama Tbk with disclosure
value of 0.31. The average related party transaction
disclosure is 0.63, and the standard deviation is 0.12.
The controlling shareholders variable, Gunawan
Dianjaya Steel Tbk is the highest family ownership
company while Berlian Laju Tanker Tbk is the lowest
family share company. The average family ownership
is 60.35 percent with the standard deviation is 19.23
percent. Prasidha Aneka Niaga Tbk is the company
that has the largest family directors. Table 2 shows
some companies do not place families in the board of
directors as evidenced with the minimum percentage
of family directors is 0 percent. The average of the
family director is 22.6 percent while the standard de-
viation is 0.229.
The next variable is the characteristics of the
audit committee. The descriptive statistic in Table 2
shows the highest number of audit committees are
Charoen Pokphand Indonesia Tbk, Malindo Feedmill
Tbk, and Nusa Konstruksi Engineering Tbk. The low-
est number of audit committees is Borneo Lumbung
Energi & Metal. The average number of audit com-
mittee meetings held during a year is five times. The
most frequent audit committee meeting is held by
Charoen Pokphand Indonesia Tbk. The average of
audit committee’s accounting expertise is 0.39 with
the highest score is ‘1’ and the lowest value is ‘0’. The
average of the independent audit committee is 0.92.
The highest independent audit committee is ‘1’ and
the lowest value is ‘0’.
Regression test
The hypothesis was tested using the OLS model.
Before testing the hypothesis, a classic assumption test
was performed. The classic assumption test shows that
our data is normally distributed and free from
multicollinearity problems, autocorrelation, and
heteroscedasticity. The regression test results are pre-
sented in Table 3.
Our results show families as controlling share-
holders have a negative effect on related party trans-
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
RPTD 244 0.313 0.930 0.631 0.125099 
FS 244 21.190 98.000 60.352 19.23934 
FD 244 0.000 0.800 0.226 0.229843 
SKA 244 1.000 5.000 3.041 0.371794 
MKA 244 1.000 32.000 5.422 3.642186 
ACKA 244 0.000 1.000 0.393 0.277038 
INKA 244 0.000 1.000 0.927 0.197231 
            
SIZE 244 19.807 32.270 28.528 1.704554 
LEV 244 0.027 5.771 0.503 0.457002 
AUD 244 0.000 1.000 0.295 0.457017 
INDST 244 1.000 8.000 5.299 2.406404 
Notes:      
RPTD = related party transaction disclosure 
FS = family share 
FD = family director  
SKA = size audit committee 
MKA = meeting audit committee 
ACKA = accounting competence audit committee 
INKA = independent audit committee 
SIZE = company size  
LEV = leverage 
AUD = auditor 
INDST = industry   
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
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action disclosure. The evidence is the variable coeffi-
cient of family share ownership and the percentage of
family directors which have negative values with the
significance level of five and one percent. Thus, H
1
and H
2
 are accepted.
The size of the audit committee and the num-
ber of the audit committee meeting have positive co-
efficients. However, the coefficients are not significant.
Thus, it cannot be accepted. The coefficient of the
variable of the audit committee accounting expertise
is positive at the one percent significance level. Thus,
H5 was accepted. Furthermore, the audit committee
independence variable is positive but not significant.
Consequently, H6 cannot be supported by data.
As for the control variables, there is merely an
external auditor variable that has a positive and sig-
nificant effect on the related party transaction disclo-
sure. Meanwhile, the other variables (company size,
leverage, and type of industry) have a positive but not
significant coefficient value.
5. Discussion
The results of the hypothesis testing indicate that
the family as the controlling shareholder, as measured
by share ownership of controlling family and family
controlling member that placement in the board of
directors, has a significant negative effect on related
party transactions disclosure. In other words, the higher
the controlling family share ownership and the more
controlling family members in the board of directors,
the lower the related party transactions disclosure level.
This result is consistent with Abdullah et al. (2015)
and Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan (2007). For Indone-
sian Context, Darmadi & Sodikin (2013) also find
that family control can reduce voluntary disclosure.
The low disclosure of related party transac-
tions in the family firms indicates that related party
transactions may potentially harm the interests of
minority shareholders. This finding is in accordance
with the opinion of Faccio & Lang (2002) who state
that companies controlled by families are easier to
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Sig. 
Intercept 0.392 2.666 0.008 
FS -0.001 -2.462 0.0145** 
FD -0.091 -2.776 0.0059*** 
SKA 0.026 1.292 0.198 
MKA 0.001 0.707 0.480 
ACKA 0.091 3.385 0.0008*** 
INKA 0.045 1.184 0.237 
SIZE 0.004 0.906 0.366 
LEV 0.016 0.981 0.328 
AUD 0.059 3.399 0.0008*** 
INDST 0.001 0.457 0.648 
Adjusted R²  0.191   
F-stat  6.723***   
No. Observations 244     
Notes: * = Significant at 0.1, ** = Significant at 0.05, *** Significant at 0.01 
RPTD = Related Party Transaction Disclosure, FS = Family Share, FD = Family Director,  
SKA = Size Audit Committee, MKA = Meeting Audit Committee, ACKA = Accounting 
Competence Audit Committee, INKA = Independent Audit Committee, SIZE = Company 
Size, LEV = Leverage, AUD = Auditor, INDST = Industry Type   
 
Table 3. Regression Analysis
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transfer company resources that harm minority share-
holders. Tunneling is one of the transactions carried
out by controlling shareholders to divert company re-
sources for their personal benefit (Elkelish, 2017). The
controlling shareholders usually conduct transactions
with related parties to maintain their wealth (Setiawan
et al., 2016).
Family members of the board of directors will
facilitate the expropriate company resources. The fam-
ily member on the board of directors can collaborate
with the management to make executive decisions for
the controlling shareholder’s advantages (Yasser & Al
Mamun, 2015). In addition, the family member on
the board of directors can also limit the disclosure of
company information. The expropriation of minor-
ity shareholders through related party transactions will
be more severe if law enforcement and protection of
investors in a country are still weak, as is the case in
Indonesia (Dyanty et al., 2012).
Concentrated ownership structures and weak
investor protection make family firm in Indonesia
choose to limit disclosure of related party transactions.
This phenomenon is supported by Darmadi & Sodikin
(2013) who state that companies controlled by fami-
lies have the lower motivation to disclose wider infor-
mation in the annual report due to their intention to
maintain their interests for their personal benefit.
The result indicates that the size of the audit
committee does not affect related party transactions
disclosure. The result contradicts with Kent & Stewart
(2008) and Abdullah et al. (2015) that found the size
of the audit committee has a significant negative ef-
fect on compliance disclosure. However, this result is
consistent with the finding of Sellami & Fendri (2017).
The results support the statement that a larger num-
ber of audit committees do not guarantee the quality
of financial statements better than the number of
smaller audit committees (Mangena & Pike, 2005).
Furthermore, the size of the audit committee does not
affect related party transaction disclosure, probably
because the size of the audit committee is less able to
represent the diversity of the competence of the audit
committee. Thus, the performance of the audit com-
mittee becomes less effective.
It is also obvious that there is no influence be-
tween the number of audit committee meetings and
related party transaction disclosure. The result indi-
cates that the number of meetings cannot always be
used as a measure of the effectiveness of the audit com-
mittee. In accordance with the opinion of Menon &
Williams (1994) who state that the number of audit
committee meetings does not indicate improving the
quality of financial statements. This result is consis-
tent with the results of Othman et al. (2014), Abdullah
et al. (2015), and Sellami & Fendri (2017).
Audit committee accounting expertise has a sig-
nificant positive effect on related party transactions
disclosure. This means that the more the number of
audit committees expertise in accounting, the broader
the disclosure of the related party transactions. Audit
committee members with accounting expertise have a
better understanding of accounting standards. There-
fore, they are able to detect recording errors or non-
compliance accounting standards. In addition, audit
committees accounting expertise can also encourage
management to disclose broader information in finan-
cial statements (Mangena & Pike, 2005). Our results
support the findings of Salehi & Shirazi (2016) in Iran
context and Sellami & Fendri (2017) in South Africa
who find that the audit committee accounting exper-
tise has a significant positive effect on the disclosure
of financial statements.
The effect of the independence of the audit com-
mittee on related party transaction disclosure was also
found. However, this study fails to prove the influ-
ence of committee independence and disclosure of re-
lated party transactions. This result is consistent with
Kent & Stewart (2008) and Kusnadi et al. (2015). In
this study, the independence of the audit committee
does not have a significant effect on related party trans-
action disclosure. This may be caused by the average
company has not met the provisions of the number of
independent audit committees required by OJK Regu-
lation No. 55/PJOK.04/2015. The regulation states
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that the audit committee consists of at least three
people who are all from independent parties. How-
ever, the descriptive statistics show the average pro-
portion of independent audit committees is only 0.92.
Four characteristics of the audit committee (size,
number of meetings, accounting expertise, and inde-
pendence) were tested, but only accounting expertise
has a significant positive influence on the related party
transaction disclosure. The result indicates that Indo-
nesia has poor corporate governance. The analysis
complements the results of Utama, Utama, &
Amarullah (2017) which state that generally Indone-
sian companies have not implemented good corpo-
rate governance practices.
Furthermore, for the control variable, there is
no significant influence of firm size and related party
transactions disclosure. The finding is consistent with
Utama & Utama (2014). Any significant influences
are not found between leverage and related party trans-
actions disclosure. This result is consistent with
Suhardjanto & Dewi (2011), Abdullah et al. (2015),
and Mensah (2018).
Lastly, this study found that big four auditors
can increase related party transaction disclosure. The
results prove the opinion of Premuroso & Bhattacharya
(2008) who state that the experience and good repu-
tation of the big four auditors are able to encourage
clients to improve the quality of financial statements
through the disclosure of broader financial statements.
This result is consistent with Tsalavoutas (2011). Fi-
nally, there is no influence on the type of industry and
the level of related party transactions disclosure.
Sensitivity analysis
A sensitivity test was employed to test the ro-
bustness of the results of the hypothesis test. Employ-
ing the actual compliance score may not be normally
distributed (Sellami & Fendri, 2017). Following
Tsalavoutas (2011), Abdullah et al. (2015), and Sellami
& Fendri (2017), to reduce the problems that might
arise from the use of the actual disclosure value, the
dependent variable was transformed into a log odds
ratio formulated as follows:
Y = log ( ݌1−݌) (3)
Where:
Y = value of transformation of RPTD score
p = actual value of RPTD
The next step was repeating all empirical tests
(classic assumption test and hypothesis test). The clas-
sic assumption test results show that the data meets
the classical assumption test requirements (normality,
multicollinearity, autocorrelation, and heteroscedasti-
city). The results of the sensitivity test are presented in
Table 4. Table 4 shows that the results of the hypoth-
esis testing do not change. Therefore, it can be con-
cluded that the results are robust.
6. Conclusion, Limitations, and Suggestions
Conclusion
This research examines the influence of families
as controlling shareholders and audit committee char-
acteristics (size, number of meetings, accounting ex-
pertise, and independence) on related party transac-
tion disclosure. Non-financial companies that listed
on the IDX in 2017 were employed. The final sample
is 244 companies.
It is found out that families as controlling share-
holders have a negative effect on the related party
transactions disclosure. This shows that family-con-
trolled companies have low motivation to disclose re-
lated party transactions. This result can be an indica-
tion that the family as the controlling shareholder takes
advantage of related party transactions.
The audit committee as part of the corporate
governance mechanism has not been able to mitigate
the information asymmetry in family firms. As evi-
dence is in the hypothesis test, out of the four charac-
teristics of the audit committee tested (size, number of
meetings, accounting expertise, and independent au-
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Variable Coefficient t-statistic Sig. 
Intercept -0.158 -0.529 0.598 
FS -0.002 -2.622 0.009*** 
FD -0.174 -2.602 0.010** 
SKA 0.046 1.152 0.250 
MKA 0.003 0.669 0.504 
ACKA 0.180 3.283 0.0012*** 
INKA 0.093 1.197 0.233 
SIZE 0.007 0.759 0.449 
LEV 0.033 1.027 0.306 
AUD 0.126 3.528 0.0005*** 
INDST 0.000 0.040 0.968 
Adjusted R²  0.187   
F-stat  6.607***   
No. Observations 244     
Notes: * = Significant at 0.1, ** = Significant at 0.05, *** Significant at 0.01  
RPTD = Related Party Transaction Disclosure, FS = Family Share, FD = Family Director,  
SKA = Size Audit Committee, MKA = Meeting Audit Committee, ACKA = Accounting 
Competence Audit Committee, INKA = Independent Audit Committee, SIZE = Company 
Size, LEV = Leverage, AUD = Auditor, INDST = Industry Type     
 
Table 4. Sensitivity Analysis
dit committee) only the audit committee accounting
expertise which was able to increase the related party
transaction disclosure. The results provide evidence of
the lower implementation of good corporate gover-
nance in Indonesia.
This research has at least three implications.
First, it may add insight to investors about related party
transactions disclosure, especially in companies con-
trolled by families. Second, the findings can be used as
consideration for investors who will invest in family
companies, especially in Indonesia. Third, the find-
ings can be the inputs for regulators and capital mar-
ket supervisors to evaluate regulations regarding audit
committees, especially at independent points.
Limitations and suggestions
This study has several limitations. First, a check-
list of related party transactions disclosure was not
consulted to independent practitioners. Thus, differ-
ent interpretations are possible. Second, the aspect used
was only family firms. Therefore, the level of compli-
ance of related party transactions disclosure between
family and non-family companies cannot be compared.
Third, this research only used one corporate gover-
nance mechanism, namely the audit committee, in the
analysis.
Based on the limitations, the following are
some suggestions for further research: (1) future re-
searchers can consult a checklist of related party trans-
actions disclosure to independent practitioners to ob-
tain a better checklist assessment; (2) future studies
can employ families and non-families sample to be
able to compare the results, and it would be better if
the samples are obtained from different countries; and
(3) future researchers can add other corporate gover-
nance mechanisms to better represent the overall cor-
porate governance.
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